NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION-THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN THOMPSON v. CITY
OF LOUISVILLE AND GARNER v. LOUISIANA
Twice in the last two years, the Supreme Court of the 'United States
has overturned state criminal convictions on due process grounds for
what the Court termed an absolute lack of evidence. 1 The novelty of such
action warrants close examination of the decisions.
The first case, Thompson v. Louisville,2 involved an alleged violation
of municipal loitering and disorderly conduct ordinances. Although "disorderly conduct" was not defined by that ordinance, it expressly outlawed
sleeping, lying, loafing, or trespassing without prior consent of the owner
or controller of the property involved by any person without visible means
of support or unable to give a satisfactory account of himself. The undisputed evidence showed that the defendant, who was a local handyman and
self-supporting, had amused himself by dancing or shuffling his feet to the
music of a jukebox while waiting in a tavern approximately half an hour
for a bus. The tavern proprietor failed to object to his conduct, but defendant had not obtained his prior consent. The arresting police officer
testified that defendant had been "very argumentative" after arrest. Defendant was convicted despite his contention that conviction on either
charge based on this evidence would violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. After allowing certiorari directly to the Louisville
Police Court,3 the Supreme Court stated that the issue was the existence
of any evidence rather than the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction,4 and decided that the only basis for conviction consistent with the
loitering ordinance and the evidence that defendant had means of support
was that he was "unable to give a satisfactory account of himself while
loitering in the cafe, without the consent of the manager." 5 The Court
then ruled that the facts of record established none of the elements of the
crime: defendant's statement to the arresting officer that he was waiting for
a bus was a sufficient account of himself; loitering or loafing did not embrace shuffling one's feet to music; and the proprietor's failure to object
to defendant's presence constituted consent. 6 The Court also found no
1 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Thompson v. City of Louisville,

362 U.S. 199 (1960).

2362 U.S. 199 (1960). This case has been popularly referred to as the "Shufflin'
Sam" case. See Blank, The High Court and "Shufflhi Sam," Reader's Digest, Nov.
1961, p. 94; Time, April 4, 1960, p. 15.
aDeterminations of the police court on minor matters are not appealable or
reviewable by other Kentucky Courts. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 26.010, 26.080 (1959) ; 362
U.S. at 202 n.4 (1960) (citing unreported Kentucky cases). Thus the police court
was the "highest court ' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).

4 362 U.S. at 199.
50 Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
(1137)
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evidence of disorderly conduct, stating that arguing with an arresting
7
policeman could not be proscribed by the state.
The second case, Garner v. Louisiana,8 involved alleged violations of
a disturbing-the-peace statute. The statute stated that "disturbing the
peace is the doing of any of the following in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public . . . [enumerating various specific
acts, 9 and] (7) Commission of any other act in such a manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the public." 10 The undisputed facts 11 showed
that defendants, who were Negroes, took seats at a segregated lunch bar
in a privately owned department store. They were informed that they
would be served if they moved. After their failure to do so, the store
manager summoned police who ordered the defendants to leave the lunch
counter and arrested them for disturbing the peace when they refused.
Apparently the manager never asked the defendants to leave. When the
Louisiana Supreme Court refused to review defendants' convictions,' 2 they
secured certiorari, contending, inter alia, that their convictions were not
based upon any evidence of guilt, and were therefore unconstitutional under
the rule of the Thompson case.13 The majority of the Court examined the
language and construction of the statute and the Louisiana cases defining
disturbing the peace and concluded "that Louisiana law requires a finding
of outwardly boisterous or unruly conduct in order to charge a defendant
with 'foreseeably' disturbing or alarming the public." 14 Rejecting the
7 Id. at 205-06. The Court did not develop the point that arguing with policemen
cannot be prohibited as disorderly conduct, but cryptically cited Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), which held a state criminal statute void for vagueness.
See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
R v. 67, 76 (1960). In stating that "merely 'arguing' with a policeman is not, because it could not be, 'disorderly conduct' as a matter of the substantive law of
Kentucky. . . ." the Thompson, Court may have meant that "disorderly conduct"
could not be interpreted to embrace arguing with policemen-in which case Lanzetta
is irrelevant because it dealt with a statute which had too many meanings, not one
which would require distortion to fit certain conduct. A lack-of-notice analysis
would have been more fruitful, see notes 45-52 infra and accompanying text, or the
Court might have questioned the power of the state to proscribe arguing with police
officers, see note 61 infra and accompanying text. Lanzetta is relevant to the anticipation argument but not to the question of the state's power to proscribe the activity
because the Court in Lanzetta assumed that the state had such power.
8s68 U.S. 157 (1961).
9 Specific acts enumerated by the statute but not involved in Garner were:
"(1) Engaging in a fistic encounter; or (2) Using of any unnecessarily loud,
offensive or insulting language; or (3) Appearing in an intoxicated condition; or
(4) Engaging in any act in a violent and tumultous manner by any three or more
persons; or (5) Holding of an unlawful assembly; or (6) Interruption of any lawful
assembly of people ....
"
LA. REv. STAT. § 14:103 (1950).
10 Ibid.
11There were actually three cases involved, Garner v. Louisiana, Briscoe v
Louisiana, and Hoston v. Louisiana, but the Court stated that variances in the facts
were immaterial. 368 U.S. at 159. The facts described in text are those of the
Hoston case. Id. at 159-60.
12 Id. at 161.
13 See Brief for Petitioner, p. 3.
14 368 U.S. at 169.
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possibility that the Louisiana courts had reinterpreted the statute, 15 the
Court held that defendants' passive presence at the lunch counter was not
evidence of boisterous or unruly conduct, and thus not evidence of public
disturbance within its interpretation of Louisiana law. The Court further
held that even if the proscription encompassed peaceful and orderly conduct which might cause "imminent public commotion," there was nothing
in the record to suggest that such commotion was imminent.16
Thus in their essentials, the two cases were identical: they both came
from the lowest state court without a clarifying opinion by the state supreme
court; they both involved breach-of-the-peace type laws firmly embedded
in our common-law heritage; 17 and in both cases, the Supreme Court
supplied a construction of the law demanding evidence which it found had
not been produced.
The correctness of the holding of the Supreme Court in both casesthat the state may not constitutionally convict a person without any evidence
of guilt-might seem self-evident. 18 However, the following analysis will
attempt to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's "no evidence" terminology is inaccurate and improper if "no evidence" is to be used in the
manner indicated by the opinions. 19
I. "No EVmENCE" AS CHA ACTERIZATION OF EVIDENCE
A loitering ordinance is a characterization-type law; 20 it proscribes a
course of conduct-Z-, for example loafing, which cannot be objectively
determined, and requires the trier of the case to decide whether the acts
evidenced-X and Y-should be characterized as Z-type conduct. 21 If an
appellate court states that there is no evidence to support a conviction based
on a characterization-type proscription, the court may mean either that X
15 The Court gave two reasons for its refusal: there was no indication that the
Louisiana Supreme Court had done so; it was unwilling to infer that an inferior court
"intended to overrule a long-standing and reasonable interpretation of a state statute
by that State's highest court." Ibid.
16 Ibid. The majority rejected a contention by the state that the court below
might have taken judicial notice of the history of racial segregation and the passions
and tensions which could have given rise to a disturbance. Id. at 173.
17 See, e.g., King v. Summers, 1 Lev. 159, 91 Eng. Rep. 772 (1664).
See also
4 BLACKSTONE,
Com-ENTARIEs *142-53.
8
'

Two law reviews commenting on the Thompson case were content to state

that the no-evidence rule is obviously required by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REv. 81, 108 (1960); 62 W. VA. L. REv. 384, 386
(1960). See also Note, 14 STAN. L. REv. 328, 331-33 (1962).
19 Should the prosecutor rest after merely stating that defendant was guilty of
the crime, a finding of no evidence to support a conviction would be not only clearly

warranted
but the most accurate use of "no evidence."
2

OAs distinguished from an objective proscription.

See generally Freund, The

Use 2of
Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921).
- 1 In many cases involving such laws the jury will be asked whether X and Y
occurred and whether they constituted a breach of the law. In sending the case to
the jury, the judge interprets the law as possibly, but not necessarily, proscribing X
and Y. Cf. HOLmES, THE CoMo LAw 126-27 (1881). The jury does not infer
violation of the law from X and Y but decides whether to characterize X and Y
as violations. Cf. Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635
(1962). See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (2d ed. 1955) ; Bohlen, Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1924).
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and Y cannot reasonably be inferred from the other evidence presented, or
that X and Y activity is not encompassed by the proscription. Only the
former use of "no evidence"-to denote insufficient proof of X and Y-is
accurate; for to say that X and Y activity does not constitute conduct within
the ambit of the proscription is to reinterpret the statute by characterizing
22
X and Y, not to measure a quantum of evidence.
An objective criminal statute proscribes particular acts which in theory
may be determined by the trier of the case without characterization of evidence. For example, when a defendant is charged with speeding, proof
of fact X, that he exceeded the speed limit, conclusively establishes the
objective crime Z. Z will be proved by convincing the trier of the case that
he should infer X from facts R, S, and T,' 3 the existence of which can also
be determined without characterization.
A. "No Evidence" in Thompson
Since loitering is a characterization-type proscription and there clearly
was evidence in Thompson of conduct which the lower court had characterized as "loitering," the only "no evidence" line of analysis open to the
Court was to find that defendant's acts-X and Y-were not proscribed by
the ordinance. This necessarily involved redefining the statute-a prerogative of the state courts only-by recharacterizing X and Y under the guise
of a "no evidence" finding-a faulty approach for even a state appellate
court. The Court attempted to avoid this double misuse of "no evidence"
by delineating three elements of proof required by the ordinance to establish
the crime of loitering: that defendant could not give a satisfactory account
of himself; that defendant was sleeping, lying, loafing or trespassing; that
defendant did not have the owner's consent.2 4 However, since each element
itself required additional characterization,2 5 this refining process only
further obscured the Court's holding. The Court may have thought that
by refining the crime into these elements, it could treat the Louisville
loitering ordinance as an objective law. The Court stated that "there
simply is no semblance of evidence from which any person could reasonably
infer that petitioner could not give a satisfactory account of himself or that
he was loitering or loafing there (in the ordinary sense of the words) with22 This analysis does not mean to deny that words may have different meanings
in different contexts, but rather to suggest that "no evidence" is most meaningfully
used to denote unreasonableness of inference, i.e., as an extreme of "insufficiency of
evidence." Compare American School of Magnetic Healing v.McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 109-110
(1902).
2
3 For example, evidence of the impact with which defendant's car struck a tree,
or eyewitness testimony.
24 362 U.S. at 204-05.
2
5 What isa "satisfactory account of himself" isopen to speculation; certainly
reasonable courts could differ on its meaning. While "sleeping," "lying," and "trespassing" may not require characterization, "loafing" obviously does-it is at least arguable that anyone sitting at a bar is loafing. "Prior consent" is a legal conclusion, the
meaning of which must be supplied either implicitly or explicitly by the courts of
Kentucky.
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out 'the consent of the owner or controller' of the cafe." 26 Thus the
apparent basis for the Court's holding was that the Louisville Police Court
had made an unreasonable inference from the facts rather than an unreasonable characterization of them. But since the elements employed as
evidentiary yardsticks by the Court were not objective, but themselves
required further characterization, the Court must have been using "no evidence" to express dissatisfaction with the characterization below and not
to describe a quantitative deficiency of the evidence.
Even had the Supreme Court succeeded in reducing loitering to objective elements, or if loitering were an objective crime, the Court could not
properly have used the "no evidence" analysis. 27 When a lower state court
convicts or when a state appellate court upholds a conviction against attacks
on sufficiency of evidence, it holds, in effect, that the conduct proved was
proscribe& 8 Otherwise, it would be convicting the defendant for a crime
26 362 U.S. at 205.

27
There is a line of analogous cases from which it might be argued that the
Supreme Court may apply the no-evidence rationale to objective law cases. The
Court has stated many times in cases involving statutory presumptions that unreasonable presumptions, those involving no "rational connection between the fact proved

and the ultimate fact presumed .

.

.

."

Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219

U.S. 35, 43 (1910), are violative of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (dictum); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 90 (1934) ; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1929) ; McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 82 (1911). Read literally, these cases seem to hold
that state legislatures may not act too illogically in their formulation of rules of
evidence. Assuming that the cases stand for such a proposition, there seems to be
no reason to treat state judiciaries differently, i.e., to allow irrational inferences from
the evidence.
1Vowever, the presumption cases have been severely criticized for the broadness

of their language. See McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954) ; Morgan, Federal Con-.
stitutional Limitations upon Premmptions Created by State Legislation, in HARVAm
LEGAL EssAys 323 (1934) ; 4 WIGMoRz,
EVIDENCE §§ 1353-56 (3d ed. 1940) ; Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TuL. L. REV. 17, 178 (1930-31) ; Keeton, Statutory Presmptions-Their Cojstitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEXAS L. REV. 34
(1931).
Under Wigmore's explanation of these cases, although the legislatures
purported to be making only rules of evidence, they actually made substantive changes
in the law which were unconstitutional, i.e., in making an irrational inference from
fact X to proscription Z the legislature was in effect proscribing X which in these
cases was constitutionally protected activity. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra § 1353.
Although criticized for the practice, the Supreme Court periodically decides cases
which may be read broadly to hold that government, both federal and state, must
do only what it purports to do. The presumption cases fit this interpretation, as
do Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (federal) and Baker v. Carr, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4203 (U.S. March 26, 1962) (state).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252 (1957) (state). As to conflicts with basic principles of our federal system created by such control of the states, see Baker v. Carr, mpra at 4245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; cases cited note 28 infra.
If Garner and Thompson were objective cases, a requirement that government
do what it purports to do would give the Supreme Court power to weigh sufficiency
of evidence, i.e., to test the logic of an inference from the evidence, and power to
require state courts to articulate changes in the criminal law or be bound by their
previous interpretations. The Supreme Court might also choose to reject changed
interpretations of criminal proscriptions-whether articulated or unarticulated-by
any court other than the highest court of the state-highest in the sense of having
the ultimate power to interpret the proscription involved-because of the undesirability
of diverse interpretations within a state.
28 Probably the best statement to the effect that a state court, in holding that
there is sufficient evidence of a crime, interprets the statute to proscribe the conduct
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other than the one for which he was indicted, clearly an unconstitutional
procedure. 29 Thus if a person is convicted of murder in state A on evidence which would establish merely larceny in other jurisdictions, that
which other states call larceny must be murder under state A law.a0 If
the United States Supreme Court then holds that there is "no evidence"
or insufficient evidence upon which a murder conviction can be based, it
substitutes its interpretation of the statute for that of the state A court.
Thus in Thompson, the Supreme Court, by characterizing the evidence
differently than had the Kentucky court, interpreted the Louisville loiter31
ing ordinance as not proscribing the defendant's conduct.
B. "No Evidence" in Garner
The Garnercase is identical to Thompson in most respects. A characterization-type statute is involved which proscribes acts that would "foreseeably [and do unreasonably] disturb or alarm the public ;" 32 the Court
treated the statute as proscribing "outwardly boisterous or unruly conduct"
or "peaceful and orderly conduct . . . [likely to cause a] public commotion," 3 3 and held that there was "no evidence to support a finding that
4
. . . [defendants] disturbed the peace . . ." under Louisiana law.
proved is found in the head note to Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; "The
affirmance by the Supreme Court of a State of a conviction under a statute as having
support in the evidence, necessarily construes the statute as authorizing punishment
for the act so proven." This head note is a generalized paraphrase of a similar
statement by the Court, id. at 255. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) ;
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312
(1926); ef. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
29 See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
Since state courts are presumed
to act constitutionally, Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 205 (1950) ; Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886), and since inclusion of the activity proved by the evidence
within the proscription is the only other constitutionally acceptable theory sustaining
the conviction below the Supreme Court should assume that the proscription has
been interpreted to bar defendant's conduct, and pass on the constitutionality of such
interpretation.
30 The state is, of course, limited by the fourteenth amendment. The proscription
must be so phrased as to give notice in two senses-notice that certain activity is
penalized by the statute and notice of what will be the crucial issues at trial. Compare Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), with Cole v. Arkansas,
333 U.S. 196 (1948). See also notes 48-49 infra and accompanying text.
31 Of the cases cited by the Thompson Court to support its no-evidence rule,
362 U.S. at 206 n.13, all but one, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957), are irrelevant. The Court might also have cited Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252 (1957). The holdings of both Schware and Konigsberg are ambiguous.
They may be "characterization" cases involving an illegitimate Supreme Court reinterpretation of a state standard, or holdings that the states could not constitutionally
punish the activity evidenced. See 106 U. PA. L. REv. 753 (1958); note 46 infra
and accompanying text. The Court also cited United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Comm'r, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (review of federal court deportation decision) ; Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (trial dominated by mob passions); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (unequal protection and administration of the law);
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (discrimination in selection of grand jury);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (federal statutory presumption) ; Mooney
v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecutor).
32
LA. REv. STAT. § 14:103 (1950); see text accompanying note 9 supra.
33 368 U.S. at 169.
34 Id. at 173.
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The Court made it clear that its analysis rested on a determination of the
evidence necessary to support a finding of disturbing the peace followed
by a decision as to whether the record contained any such evidence. 35 As
in Thompson, the elements of the crime as defined by the Court required
further characterization 3 6 Thus again in Garner,the Court's true holding
was that the Louisiana statute did not proscribe the defendant's conductpeaceful "sit-in" demonstrations.
C. The Error of Characterizationby the Supreme Court
In both Thompson and Garner, the Supreme Court, without benefit of
a state supreme court opinion explaining the basis of conviction below, was
confronted with a decision of the lowest state court 37 embodying either an
apparently unreasonable construction of the law 3 8 or an apparent departure
from prior cases interpreting the statute. The majority and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring, recognized in Garner that the Court had to decide
the case on the basis of the statute as construed by the courts of Louisiana,3 9
but were unwilling to assume that the lower court had adopted an unprecedented construction of the statute.40 This reluctance to accept the
trial court's interpretation of the statute may have stemmed from a confusion of the federal courts' role in determining what state law is for purposes of independently applying it-as in a diversity action-with the
Supreme Court's appellate function of review of state court action in the
actual case before it. In the former instance the federal courts are charged
with determining what the state judicial system would do if it had to decide
the case then before the federal court.41 In the latter instance the state
judicial system has already decided this case. Therefore, state law for the
purposes of Supreme Court review must be what the state court actually
did.4 By apparently requiring in Garner and Thompson that the state
35
Id. at 170.
3
6Neither "boisterous conduct" nor "likely to cause a public disturbance" convey
the same meaning to all reasonable men.
37
In Thompson, no other court had jurisdiction to review the decision, 362 U.S.
at 202, and in Garner, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to review. 368 U.S. at
161; see note 40 infra.
38 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204-06 (1960).
39 See 368 U.S. at 165-69, 174-75.
40 Id. at 169. This was so despite the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court
had had the opportunity, but declined to review the lower court decision, stating that
"'the rulings of the district on matters of law are not erroneous.'" Id. at 161.
41 Since the lower state courts necessarily look to the highest court of the state,
this will usually mean a guess as to what the highest state court would decide on
these facts. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1940).
Where the highest state court would not have the opportunity to decide the legal
issue in question, see note 43 infra, the focus should then be on the highest court that
would have such opportunity. See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198,
205 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYsTrEm 628-30 (1953); 110 U. PA. L. R v. 602 (1962).
42
See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) (interpretation of state criminal
statute by trial court binding on Supreme Court); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242.
255 (1937) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) ; Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926); 106 U. PA. L. REv. 753, 757 (1958). Cf. Bahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921). But see note 27 supra.
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supreme court explicitly declare a novel statutory meaning or affirm a trial
court's characterization of evidence in order to bind the Supreme Court on
appellate review, 43 the Court has imposed an unwarranted and severe
limitation on a state's power to interpret its own law.4

II. "No

EVIDENCE" AS EMBODYING ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTEES
The Supreme Court should have affirmed the convictions by acknowledging that the state courts had reinterpreted the statutory proscriptions
to encompass the activities in question, unless such reinterpretation was
constitutionally barred. A possible bar is that change of proscription in
this manner did not adequately apprise the defendants of what conduct
the state deemed criminal or of what the state's theory of prosecution
would be at trial; 45 or, the reinterpretation might be barred because it
proscribed conduct that is constitutionally protected from any criminal
sanctions.

46

The stronger attack on such reinterpretation is to contend that a
reasonable man could not have understood the statutes to bar tapping his
feet to music in a tavern or participating in a passive sit-in demonstration.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Garner, treated Thompson as
holding that a disorderly conduct conviction based on arguing with a
43 Note that this approach by the Supreme Court in Thompsmir makes it virtually
impossible for the state courts to interpret the loitering ordinance differently than
the Supreme Court has since the court most likely to apply and interpret the municipal
ordinance would be the Louisville Police Court and most determinations by that court
are not reviewable by any higher state court. See note 3 supra.
44 Thus it appears that Mr. Justice Harlan had the better argument in Garner;
the no-evidence approach should have been eschewed in favor of an analysis of the
statute as applied. Even he, however, seemed to differ with the majority not on
basic issues but rather as to whether the Louisiana Supreme Court had expressly

construed the statute involved. He stated: "[T]he Court's view that the statute
covers only non-peaceful conduct is unacceptable, since I believe that the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided the opposite in these very cases. I think that State Supreme
Court's refusal to review these convictions, taken in light of its assertion that the rulings of the district judge on matters of law are not erroneous, must be accepted as an
authoritative and binding state determination that the petitioners' activities, as revealed
in these records, did violate the statute .

.

.

."

368 U.S. at 187 (Harlan, J., con-

curring). He accepted Thompson as correctly decided, but distinguishable, apparently
assuming that the Kentucky court in Thompson did not interpret the loitering ordinance in any way other than its face meaning and that there simply was no evidence
to support a conviction on that meaning. See id. at 185, 189-90 (Harlan, J., concurring). If that was his basis for distinguishing Thompson, Mr. Justice Harlan
committed the same error as the majority. Except for the peculiar circumstances of
the Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to review in Garner, he was willing to ignore
the effect of the lower court determinations.
45 See note 30 sitpra.
46 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Cantwell would
probably form the basis of the protected activity argument in Thompsm. For the
argument in Garner, see the concurring opinions by Justices Douglas and Harlan,
368 U.S. at 176, 185. Compare Taylor v. Louisiana, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3374 (U.S.
June 4, 1962) (citing Garner in a protected activity situation) ; see generally Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
The merits of the theory are beyond the scope of this Note.
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policeman was unconstitutional because of lack of notice. 47 It is clearly
unconstitutional to penalize a man for doing an act that he could not
reasonably be expected to know was proscribed. "[A] statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 4 8

It is

evident that a sudden and unreasonable-in light of the wording of the
law-departure from previous interpretations violates this notice require49
ment.
The notice argument is especially forceful in the Garner context because of the possibility of infringing on first amendment rights. Mr.
Justice Harlan, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut50 in his concurring opinion,
states: "[W]hen a state seeks to subject to criminal sanctions conduct
which, except for a demonstrated paramount state interest, would be within
the range of freedom of expression .

.,

it cannot do so by means of a

general and all-inclusive breach of the peace prohibition. It must bring the
activity sought to be proscribed within the ambit of a statute or clause
'narrowly drawn

.

.

5

A determination that the evidence adduced relates only to activity that
could constitutionally be proscribed-on the ground of either notice or
protected activity-can be said to be a finding of "no evidence" of any
punishable conduct. 2 Although such a use of "no evidence" had not been
expressly stated before these cases were decided, the Court may have used
"no evidence" in this sense.-s If such was the Court's intention, the
opinions are singularly uninformative and misleading.
Aside from the
cryptic statement that "merely 'arguing' with a policeman is not, because
it could not be, 'disorderly conduct' as a matter of the substantive
law of Kentucky" 5 and citation of Langetta v. New Jersey 56 in reference
47368 U.S. at 190 (Harlan, J., concurring).

196 48
(1948).
49

Cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1948);

Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 446-55 (1935)

(Cardozo, J., dissenting); Note,

109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 73-74 n.34 (1960).
80 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
51368 U.S. at 202 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52 Cf. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
To determine whether the activities could constitutionally be proscribed the Supreme
Court must examine the facts independently. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). The only limits on such
scrutiny of the facts are those inherent in the appellate process. See Mishkin, The
Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLum. L. REv. 157, 172-75 (1953).
53 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) might be explained as holding that there was "no
evidence" in this sense.
54 Cf. Torrance v. Salzinger, 297 F.2d 902, 905-06 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 30
U.S.L. WEEK 3363 (U.S. May 21, 1962) (dictum).
55 362 U.S. at 206.
86306 U.S. 451 (1939). See note 7 supra.

1146

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.110:1137

to the disorderly conduct conviction, there is no indication in Thompson
57
that the Court did anything other than to recharacterize the evidence.
Similarly, the Court in Garner used the Thompson approach with only two
hints that "no evidence" might have been used to subsume constitutional
bars to reinterpretation of the proscription: its citation of Cole v.
Arkansas.58 for tangential points; r9 and its closing statement: "Such activity, in the circumstances of these cases, is not evidence of any crime and
cannot be so considered . . . by . . . the courts."

60

III. CONCLUSION

In these two cases, the Supreme Court overturned state criminal convictions because it found "no evidence" upon which a conviction could be
based. The enigmatic opinions have led one court of appeals to interpret
Thompson and Garner as creating a new constitutional right-the right
not to be convicted of a crime if "proof of some essential element of the
alleged crime" is lacking. 6'
At worst, these cases arrive at what may be the correct result by way
of inapt terminology, and in the process make a deep incursion upon basic
principles of federalism-"no evidence" becomes characterization of evidence. At best, these opinions have coined a new label for an old concept
and have unnecessarily clouded the law.s
J.E.G.
57

Indeed, all the other indications are to the contrary, see notes 22, 25-26 supra
and accompanying text.
58333 U.S. 196 (1948).
This is clearly a notice case; the Court held unconstitutional a conviction where the indictment charged violation of section 1 of the
statute and the conviction rested on section 2.
50 368 U.S. at 164 & n.10.
'O Id. at 174 (emphasis added). The strongest indication that the Court in
Thompson and Garner used "no evidence" to signify that the proscriptions could not
constitutionally be interpreted to bar the activity proved is its vigorous insistence in
both cases that it was deciding on the basis of no evidence as distinguished from
insufficient evidence. See 362 U.S. at 199; 368 U.S. at 162-63.
61 Torrance v. Salzinger, 297 F.2d 902, 905-06 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 3363 (U.S. May 21, 1962) (Hastie, J.) (dictum); cf. Commonwealth ex rel.
Torrance v. Salzinger, 406 Pa. 268, 177 A.2d 619, cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. W=EK 3363
(U.S. May 21, 1962).
62 The psychological problem in Thompsm was, no doubt, partly to blame for
the Court's faulty analysis. A clear case of injustice was presented in which the
defendant was obviously a victim of police harassment. A holding of "no evidence"
dramatized the injustice. But see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Thompson opinion may also have been shaped in
part by the emphasis in petitioner's argument on the "no evidence" rationale. The
only reference to statutory construction is found in the Reply Brief for Petitioner,
p. 9. Note that both Thompson and Garner were before the Supreme Court on
certiorari. Counsel in both cases may have overlooked their right to an appeal and
shaped their arguments accordingly. See Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1958);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).

